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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS,
WAREHOUSEMEN AND
H E L P E R S , LOCAL UNION 222
and LOCAL UNION 976,
Plaintiffs-Respondents, \ Case No.
13679
vs.
MOTOR CARGO, a corporation,
Defendcmt-A ppellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

NATURE OF T H E CASE
This is an action by Respondents to obtain an
Order of the Court requiring the parties to the action
to arbitrate a grievance arising out of a collective bargaining labor agreement which provides that such grievance be arbitrated.
1
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DISPOSITION OF CASE
I N T R I A L COURT
The Trial Court found that a grievance had arisen
between the parties to the Collective Bargaining Agreement, that the Agreement provided that such grievances
be arbitrated when timely requested, that a timely
request was made of the employer defendant by the
unions. The Court then ordered the grievance to be
arbitrated by Joseph C. Fratto, and retained jurisdiction of the matter in the event any problems arose as
to the selection of the Arbitrator or as to the issues to
be arbitrated.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the judgment and
a direction from this Court that an arbitrable dispute
does not exist between the parties.
Respondents seek to have this court affirm the decision of the Trial Court in all respects.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
W e agree with the facts as stated by Appellant
and add the following:
1. The Union steward, Robinson, did not know
what the new Blue Cross-Blue Shield Plan provided,
was not given a written copy of it by the Company,
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and did not obtain a copy thereof until after he called
the Union's business agent, Neldin Stephenson, on the
phone on September 17, 1973. At that time he told Mr.
Stephenson that he did not have a copy of the Blue
Cross-Blue Shield Plan, and Mr. Stephenson asked
Robinson if he could get him a copy. H e thereafter
located a copy and gave it to Mr. Stephenson within
a day or two (R 51).
Mr. Stephenson then studied the Plan and compared it with the old company plan (R 51-52), and
as a result thereof the union met with the company
officials on September 24, 1973 (R 53) pursuant to
the Unions' claim that the new Plan constituted a
grievance that should be arbitrated (R 53-54), which
the Company refused (R 54). The Union thereafter
sent a letter to the defendant on October 9, 1973
(R 54) which appears in the Record as Exhibit " B "
attached to plaintiffs' Complaint. This letter shows
the Unions' analysis of the additional benefits of the
new Barton (Motor Cargo) Plan over its old plan,
and the Union therein requested that the matter be
submitted to arbitration on the issue as to whether the
new Plan of the Company was betten than, or only
the equivalent of, the old Plan.
2. At the trial it was agreed by the Court and
the parties that the only issue which the Court needed
to decide was whether the union had given timely
notice of its grievance to the employer as a prerequisite of arbitration (R 48-49).
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3. The only difference between plaintiffs' Complaint and the Amended Complaint is the added allegations contained in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the
Amended Complaint having to do with application
of federal law to the issues of the case. Otherwise, the
Amended Complaint is no different from the
Complaint.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
T H E RECORD ESTABLISHES APPELL A N T ' S C O N T R A C T U A L O B L I G A T I O N TO
ARBITRATE.
Appellant argues that because Respondents
failed to attach another copy of the Labor Agreement
to the Amended Complaint — the same as had been
attached to the Complaint — there was, therefore, no
Agreement before the Court to consider; that it
wasn't in evidence, and, therefore, there was no agreement to support an Order to arbitrate.
Our answer to this is:
1. In its Answer Appellant admits it entered
into a Collective Bargaining Agreement and affirmatively alleged that the Agreement speaks for itself.
This language necessarily refers to and adopts as
part of its Answer the only Agreement on file, namely,
the Agreement attached to the Complaint.
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2. At no time during the Order to Show Cause
Hearing or during the trial did Appellant object to
the use of the Agreement filed with the Complaint as
the appropriate document under consideration; and if
there were ever any merit to appellant's argument, it
surely waived any right to protest the use of that document at the trial.
3. The appellant freely acknowledged at the trial
that the only issue to be determined was the 30-day
notice clause in the Agreement which was attached
to the Complaint and which it freely used in its presentation before the Court. (R 48).
4. There is no difference between the allegations
of the Complaint and the Amended Complaint, except
for additional allegations in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the
Amended Complaint concerning facts inducing the
application of federal law; and the failure of plaintiffs to attach the same Agreement to the Amended
Complaint which it had attached to the Complaint does
not appear to be the type of thing included in the
principles discussed by AmJur 2d as quoted by Appellant at pp.6 and 7 of its Brief.

POINT II
T H E RECORD REVEALS T H A T T H E
P A R T I E S DROPPED ANY AND ALL ISSUES F O R T H E C O U R T TO D E C I D E E X C E P T T H E I S S U E A S TO W H E T H E R
5
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T I M E L Y NOTICE AS R E Q U I R E D BY T H E
A G R E E M E N T WAS G I V E N BY P L A I N T I F F S TO D E F E N D A N T .
Respondents readily concede that there was no
evidence presented at the trial except as to the matter
of notice by the Union to the Company that there was
a grievance based on alleged changed benefits in the
health and welfare plan, and that the notice was given
within the 30-day period required by the Agreement.
On pp. 48 and 49 of the Record the Court said that
the timely notice issue was the only issue it was concerned with, and that if there were other issues, the
hearing would have to be postponed to another day. The
parties agreed to proceed and have the matter determined on this issue alone. At the conclusion of the trial
of this issue, the Court said it would take the matter
under advisement and let the parties know in due time
of its decision. No objection by either party was made
to these proceedings (R 72).
We, therefore, submit that except for the issue
of timely notice, all issues were waived, and that the
effect of such was that if the Court held that timely
notice had been given, then the matter would be arbitrated and that if timely notice had not been given,
there would be no arbitration.
W e further submit that the contract does provide
for an airing of all appropriate issues before an arbitrator rather than before the courts. The law as to this
matter begins with a statement of policy in the Labor
6
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Management Relations Act of 1947 at Section 203,
which reads:
"Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by
the parties is hereby declared to be the desirable
method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an
existing Collective Bargaining Agreement".
In 1960 the U. S. Supreme Court decided three
cases usually referred to as the Trilogy which dealt with
problems of arbitration of grievances as provided for
in collective bargaining agreements. These cases are
United Steel Workers of America vs. American Manufacturing Company, 80 S.Ct 1343; United Steel Workers of America vs. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Company, 80 S.Ct 1347; and United Steel Workers of
America vs. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 80 S.Ct
1358. In summary these cases held that where arbitration is provided for in a collective bargaining agreement, the courts may determine whether an issue is arbitrable unless the parties expressly provide that the arbitrator is to determine arbitrability. These cases emphasize that the courts must compel arbitration where a
claim by one of the parties appears to be governed by
the contract, even though the court might feel that the
grievance is baseless, and that doubts of arbitrability
should be resolved in favor of arbitration unless it could
be said with " positive assurance" that the arbitration
clause is not susceptible to an interpretation that covers
the dispute. These cases also hold that the question of
interpretation of the agreement is for the arbitrator, and
7
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that courts "have no business overruling him because
their interpretation of the contract is different from
his"; that courts should not delve into the merits of
grievances.
Quoting directly from Steel Workers vs. Warrior
and Ghdf Navigation Company, 80 S.Ct 1347, the
Court says:
"The Collective Bargaining Agreement states
the rights and duties of the parties. I t is more
than a contract. I t is a generalized code to govern a myriad of cases which the draftsman cannot wholly anticipate. The Collective Bargaining Agreement covers the whole employment
relationship. I t calls into being a new common
law-—the common law of a particular industry
or of a particular plant. * * * *
"Arbitration is the means of solving the unforeseeable by molding a system of private law for
all the problems which may arise and to provide
for their solution in a way which will generally
accord with the variant needs and desires of the
parties. The processing of disputes through the
grievance machinery is actually a vehicle by
which meaning and content is given to the Collective Bargaining Agreement. * * * *
"An order to arbitrate the particular grievance
should not be denied unless it may be said with
positive assurance that the arbitration clause is
not susceptible to an interpretation that covers
the asserted dispute. Doubts should be resolved
in favor of coverage".
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POINT III
RESPONDENTS TIMELY REQUESTED
A R B I T R A T I O N P U R S U A N T TO T H E R E QUIREMENTS OF T H E AGREEMENT.
This is the issue which the Trial Court considered
and upon which it ruled. The facts are not in dispute.
The only issue here is when does the 30-day period
begin. Does it begin when the union steward, Mr.
Robinson, learned that the Company was "enrolling
the people for the new contract which was approximately July 25" (R 16) ? At that time Mr. Robinson
was informed by Mr. Peterson, the Company's claim
manager, "that our old insurance carrier, Home Life,
had raised our premiums without any change in benefits back in June to be effective August 1, and so I
explained to them that we had gone out and done some
shopping to try to find a better program for, you know,
less, which we did. W e were going to have to pay it
anyway" (R 17-18).
If it can be said that the steward was a representative of the union for notification purposes (and
we, in fact, deny it) of what really was he notified?
The above quote is all that the Company produced as
evidence that the union was advised of the kind of an
increase in benefiits above an "equivalent" change. Mr.
Robinson was really given only an oral statement that
the company was shopping around for increased benefits for the same amount of maney to which Home Life
had increased their premiums for the same old plan.
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H e was not told they had found a better plan. H e was
not given a written plan that the union could study to
see if a change had been made that qualified as an
increase over "equivalent" benefits. Several changes
could have been made, which, when analyzed, could
well prove to be a change without any real increased
benefits. I t was a matter for study by the proper union
officials after a reasonable notice of all appropriate facts
had been given them. W e do not believe a casual conversation with the union steward by the claims manager
about shopping around for a better plan meets the
requirements of notice to the Union that the Company
had increased benefits above an equivalent amount over
the old plan. Nor did the Court believe it.
What the Court did reasonably find was, that when
the steward on September 17 called a business agent of
Local 222 and told him "that it was his understanding
that the new health and welfare plan that the company
had set up with Blue Cross-Blue Shield was a better
plan than the old health and welfare plan that they
had with Home Life" a constructive notice of a grievance may have begun to develop. At that time there
was nothing in the Record to show that the steward
knew anything about the plan prior to the call, or that
it hadn't just occurred to him that there may be an
increase in benefits which should be investigated, and
that he therefore forthwith proceeded to call the union.
The Union's business agent, Mr. Stephenson, whom
the steward called, asked the steward if he had a copy
of the new plan. H e didn't. Stephenson then asked
10
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the steward to get him a copy, and within a day or two
he did ( R 8 ) . W e submit that there was no constructive
notice to the Union until it got a copy of the plan and
studied it. Not until the Union officials could study it
and see if the new Company plan benefits were an
increase over equivalent benefits of the Company's old
plan was the Union put on notice constructively that it
had a grievance on its hands. In effect this is the way
the Court ruled, holding that within 30 days of that
time, namely a day or two after September 17, 1973,
the union notified the employer in writing (on October
9,1973, see letter attached to Complaint) of a grievance
which it wanted arbitrated according to the Agreement
inasmuch as the matter had not been resolved in the
meeting between the parties which the union had called
and held with Respondent prior thereto.
If the company can change the plan on August 1,
1973, and the 30-day period begins to run on August 1,
without the Company giving the Union any formal,
informal, written or oral notice of the essential facts,
and without the union being made aware of it from
any source, then the judgment of the trial court should
be reversed.
But if the time does not begin to run until the
union becomes aware of the grievance (which did not
occur until after September 17, 1973) then the Trial
Court's ruling should be affirmed. The Trial Court
held that until the union is aware of a grievance there
is, in effect, no grievance upon which it can give notice
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to the company to arbitrate. Justice, equity, and a
reasonable interpretation of the contract require, we
believe, affirmance of the Trial Court's judgment, and
the grievance should be arbitrated as ordered by the
Court.
CONCLUSION
Respondents respectfully submit that the judgment of the lower Court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
A. P A R K SMOOT
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